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 JUSTICE SOUTER:   
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW’S EMERGING EGALITARIAN 
 




As Supreme Court Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer voted 
repeatedly to uphold campaign finance laws over the years, they developed an 
interesting division of labor: Justice Breyer advanced egalitarian campaign 
finance theories in concurring opinions1 and scholarly writings,2 while Justice 
Souter would write majority opinions purporting to harmonize the Court’s ever 
more deferential approach in the area with the Court’s older precedents.3  I had 
suspected for some time that Justice Souter took this latter approach (rather than 
joining in Justice Breyer’s views) in order to keep Justice O’Connor’s crucial fifth 
vote in these cases.4 
Justice O’Connor’s retirement and replacement with Justice Alito has 
brought a shift in the Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence toward 
deregulation,5 relegating Justices Souter and Breyer (along with Justices Ginsburg 
and Stevens) to the minority.   This shift to the minority has freed Justice Souter 
to some degree to express his own views of the appropriate balance between the 
First Amendment and other interests in the campaign finance cases (though he 
still may be tempering his own views somewhat to remain consistent with his 
earlier opinions).  His recent dissenting opinion in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to 
                                                                                                    
* William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  I filed a 
pro bono amicus brief with Professor Richard Briffault supporting the government’s position in 
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (2007).  The brief is 
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introductory issue of this new student-edited law journal.                                                                                                        
1 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399-405 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
2 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
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3 See infra Part I. 
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Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 32 n.7 (2004). 
5 See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), draft available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1003922. 





Life6 (“WRTL”) is the clearest exposition yet of Justice Souter’s jurisprudence in 
the area, unencumbered by the need to capture a fifth vote.  It is a glimpse into 
what the Court’s jurisprudence might have looked like had the President 
appointed someone in Justice Souter’s mold rather than a more conservative 
Justice to replace Justice O’Connor. 
As this Essay argues, Justice Souter’s jurisprudence as expressed in WRTL 
demonstrates an emerging egalitarian view of campaign finance law.  It is a view 
that is broadly consistent with Justice Breyer’s “participatory self-government”7 
rationale for campaign finance regulation but more deferential to legislative 
branches about the means of achieving political equality.  Though there were 
elements of egalitarianism in Justice Souter’s earlier opinions, WRTL goes 
further.  But the Justice’s egalitarian ideas are not yet fully formed, and there is 
room for questioning some of his implicit arguments and assumptions. 
Part I of this Essay describes Justice Souter’s campaign finance views 
expressed in cases while Justice O’Connor remained on the Court.  Part II turns to 
Justice Souter’s freer approach in WRTL.  It first gives relevant background about 
the WRTL case. It then describes Justice Souter’s views in dissent, which sets 
forth a view of the government’s compelling interest in promoting “democratic 
integrity.”  It then argues that the “democratic integrity” interest, though couched 
in some anticorruption language, actually expresses a nascent egalitarian 
approach to campaign finance regulation.  The Part concludes by noting that, 
unlike Justice Breyer, Justice Souter has been insufficiently attentive to the 
problem of incumbency protection in campaign finance regulation.  In addition, 
Justice Souter has yet to fully explore three issues in his emergent egalitarian 
approach related to (1) his critique of total campaign spending; (2) his views on 
the connection between campaign spending and public cynicism about the 
political process; and, most importantly, (3) his treatment of labor unions. 
 
I.  
JUSTICE SOUTER’S PRE-WRTL CAMPAIGN FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Without going through all the jurisprudential twists and turns,8 it is 
enough to note that the Supreme Court’s modern campaign finance jurisprudence 
                                                                                                    
6 FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 2687-2705 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(“WRTL”). 
7 See Hasen, supra note 4, at 44 (describing the “participatory self-government” rationale put 
forward by Justice Breyer). 
8 For details see id. at 35-46, Richard L. Hasen, The Newer Incoherence: Competition, Social 
Science and Balancing in Campaign Finance Law after Randall v. Sorrell, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 849 
(2007) (on Randall), and Hasen, supra note 5 (on WRTL).  The next few paragraphs are drawn 
from Hasen, supra note 5. 
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traces to the Court’s 1976 opinion in Buckley v. Valeo.9 In Buckley, the Court 
established that the amounts of campaign contributions could be limited to 
prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption, but that limits on spending 
money could not be justified by an anticorruption interest (because of the lack of 
evidence that independent spending could corrupt candidates) or on equality 
grounds (because doing so would be “wholly foreign” to the First Amendment).  
The Court declared that limits on the amount of contributions only “marginally” 
restricted First Amendment rights and were therefore subject to lower 
congressional scrutiny, while spending limits more directly limited speech and 
were therefore subject to strict scrutiny.10 
Since Buckley, the Court’s jurisprudence has swung like a pendulum 
between periods of Court skepticism of campaign finance regulation and Court 
deference to Congressional and state judgments about the need for such 
regulation.  The period before Justice O’Connor’s retirement was marked by the 
greatest Court deference, as demonstrated by four cases I have dubbed the “New 
Deference Quartet.”11 
Though it may be tempting to consider the Supreme Court’s 2003 opinion 
in McConnell v. FEC12as the most important of the New Deference cases, that 
honor more properly belongs to Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,13 a 
case whose majority opinion was authored by Justice Souter.  True, McConnell 
was the longest opinion in Supreme Court history14 and concerned the most 
important piece of federal campaign finance legislation in a generation, the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA,” or “McCain-Feingold” for 
its two primary Senate sponsors).15  But McConnell, whose key majority opinion 
was co-authored by Justices O’Connor and Stevens,16 merely applied the New 
Deference approach of Justice Souter in Shrink Missouri and in two other cases 
he authored to uphold the key portions of BCRA against a facial constitutional 
challenge.  Doctrinally and conceptually, McConnell broke little new ground. 
Shrink Missouri, however, changed the tone and jurisprudence of the 
Court’s campaign finance cases.  In Shrink Missouri the Court “(1) ratcheted 
                                                                                                    
9 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
10 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26, 46-49. 
11 See Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and Expenditure 
Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 891 (2005) (discussing the “New 
Deference Quartet” of Supreme Court cases). 
12 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
13 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
14 DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN AND RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS  
892 (3d ed. 2004). 
15 116 Stat. 81. 
16 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Breyer each wrote majority opinions for the Court on other 
aspects of BCRA challenged in McConnell. 





down the level of scrutiny applicable to contribution limit challenges; (2) 
expanded the definition of ‘corruption’ and ‘the appearance of corruption’ 
necessary to sustain contribution limits; (3) lowered the evidentiary burden for a 
government defending campaign contribution limits; and (4) created a very 
difficult test for those challenging a contribution limit as unconstitutionally 
low.”17 
Justice Souter’s majority opinion in Shrink Missouri18 concomitantly 
moved strongly toward deference while professing fidelity to Buckley and its 
anticorruption rationale.  The opinion mentions Buckley 53 times and purports to 
be a mere “application” of Buckley’s principles.  But whether one agrees with the 
result in Shrink Missouri or not, it is hard to argue with Justice Thomas’s view in 
his dissent that Shrink Missouri greatly expanded Court deference well beyond 
the Buckley standard.19  It was left to Justice Breyer in a concurring opinion 
(joined only by Justice Ginsburg) to advance an egalitarian rationale for the 
Court’s deference, and to profess that Buckley’s statement rejecting equality as a 
compelling interest to justify campaign finance regulation could not be taken 
seriously.20 
In two post-Shrink Missouri cases decided before McConnell, Justice 
Souter took the same approach as he had in Shrink Missouri, professing 
adherence to precedent while expanding the scope of Court deference to 
legislative action.   In Colorado Republican II,21 Justice Souter wrote an opinion 
for the Court upholding a limit on the amounts that political parties may spend in 
coordination with their candidates for federal office. Federal law treats such 
coordinated spending as equivalent to a contribution. The opinion, relying on 
Buckley and Shrink Missouri, upheld the measure on anticorruption grounds and 
as necessary to prevent circumvention of individual campaign contribution limits.   
In FEC v. Beaumont,22 a 2003 case, Justice Souter considered for the first 
time the constitutional question of limitations on corporate election-related 
spending.  The Court had addressed corporate limits in candidate elections many 
times before Justice Souter joined the Court. In 1986, the Court had held in FEC 
                                                                                                    
17 See Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign Finance, and “The Thing That Wouldn’t 
Leave,” 17 CONSTITUTIONAL COMM. 483, 485 (2000). 
18 528 U.S. 377. 
19 Id. at 420-21 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
20 Id. at 399-405 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Shrink Missouri is also significant for Justice Thomas’s 
dissent, where he first set forth his strong deregulatory view of the campaign finance cases.  See 
[citation to be added to my forthcoming First Amendment Center essay of Justice Thomas’s 
campaign finance jurisprudence]. 
21  Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 433 U.S. 
431 (2001).  
22 539 U.S. 146 (2003). 
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v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (“MCFL”)23 that ideological corporations that 
take no corporate or union funds must be exempted on First Amendment grounds 
from laws limiting corporate independent spending in elections.  But in a 1990 
case, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court held that Congress 
could limit spending by for profit corporations because of the “corrosive and 
distorting” effects of corporate wealth on the political process. Corporations could 
use a separate segregated fund (or political action committee, more commonly 
known as a “PAC”) to advance their election-related goals.24  
In Beaumont, Justice Souter wrote an opinion for the Court holding even 
ideological corporations entitled to the MCFL exemption for corporate spending 
could be barred from making any campaign contributions to candidates.25  The 
ruling was in tension not only with MCFL but with the 1978 Bellotti v. First 
National Bank of Boston26 case, which held that the government may not limit 
corporate spending in relation to ballot measure campaigns. Bellotti strongly 
suggested corporate free speech rights are as strong as an individual’s rights, a 
point Beaumont appears to reject.  Justice Souter wrote in Beaumont that 
“corporate contributions are furthest from the core of political expression, since 
corporations’ First Amendment speech and association interests are derived 
largely from those of their members, and of the public in receiving information. A 
ban on direct corporate contributions leaves individual members of corporations 
free to make their own contributions, and deprives the public of little or no 
material information.”27   
In the last of the New Deference cases, McConnell v. FEC, the Court 
applied these New Deference precedents and the revisionist reading of Buckley to 
uphold the “soft money” and “issue advocacy” provisions of BCRA.28  In 
upholding BCRA’s issue advocacy provisions, discussed more fully in the next 
section, McConnell reaffirmed and strengthened Austin’s holding and extended it 
to labor unions.  
Though Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the majority opinion in Shrink 
Missouri and Beaumont, the Chief’s views changed in his last years on the Court, 
and at oral argument in McConnell he suggested his earlier vote in Austin in favor 
of the government a mistake.29  Thus, keeping Justice O’Connor’s vote, a justice 
                                                                                                    
23 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
24 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990). 
25 539 U.S. at 163-64. 
26 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978). 
27 Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161 n.8 (citation omitted). 
28 539 U.S. 146. 
29 McConnell v. FEC, Transcript of Oral Argument, Sept. 8, 2003, available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_1674/argument/ (statement of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist) (“I think one of the -- one of the dubious things about Austin is one of the things it 





whose positions on the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation have 
vacillated over the years,30 became crucial.  I suspected that the growing 
disconnect and incoherence31 of the Court’s New Deference cases resulted from 
Justice Souter (and then later Justice Stevens, co-author of the McConnell opinion 
with Justice O’Connor) trying to keep Justice O’Connor’s vote by purporting to 
apply existing precedent rather than expand it.  As we shall see, Justice Souter’s 
dissenting opinion in WRTL provides some support for this theory.   
 
II.  
JUSTICE SOUTER’S “DEMOCRATIC INTEGRITY” AS NASCENT 
EGALITARIANISM 
 
A. Background on WRTL32 
 
 To understand the dispute in WRTL we must begin with the 1974 
Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).33 In FECA, 
Congress sought to impose limits on any spending “relative to a clearly identified 
candidate [in federal elections]”34and to require “‘[e]very person [above a certain 
dollar threshold] . . . who makes contributions or expenditures’ . . . ‘for the 
purpose of . . . influencing’ the nomination or election of candidates for federal 
office”35 to disclose the source of such contributions and expenditures. The 
Supreme Court in Buckley viewed both of these statutes as presenting problems of 
vagueness; people engaging in political speech might well not know if the statutes 
cover their conduct.36 Vague statutes violate the Due Process Clause,37 and are a 
                                                                                                                                     
relied on was the fact that the corporation’s members or did not -- or owners did not necessarily 
represent a large amount of public opinion, and it seemed to me, I voted in the majority, but it 
seemed to me since then that that’s the whole purpose of the First Amendment is to allow people 
who perhaps don't have much in the way of public opinion try to change public opinion.”). 
30 LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 14, at 952. 
31 I trace the incoherence in Hasen, supra note 4 (discussing the “new incoherence” of 
McConnell); Hasen, supra note 8 (discussing the “newer incoherence” of Randall); and Hasen, 
supra note 5 (discussing how Court in WRTL goes “beyond incoherence”).  
32 For more comprehensive view, see Hasen, supra note 5, from which the next few paragraphs 
draws.  See also Richard Briffault, WRTL II: The Sharpest Turn in Campaign Finance’s Long 
and Winding Road, 1 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. ___ (2008). 
33 88 Stat. 1263. 
34 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41 (citing § 608(e)(1) of FECA). 
35 Id. at 77 (citing section 434(e) of FECA). 
36 Id. at 42-44, 76-78. 
37 Id. at 77. 
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special concern when the danger of chilling First Amendment rights of free 
speech and freedom of association come into play. 
 In order to save both statutes from unconstitutional vagueness, the Court 
construed them as reaching only “communications that in express terms advocate 
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.”38 The Court explained that 
such express advocacy required explicit words “of advocacy of election or defeat, 
such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ 
‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ [or] ‘reject.’”39 So construed, the Court still struck down 
the spending limits as violating the First Amendment,40 but it upheld the 
disclosure requirements.41 
 Buckley left unregulated by FECA advertisements intended to or likely to 
influence the outcome of an election but lacking words of express advocacy. Such 
advertisements became known as “issue advocacy,” even though the prime issue 
at stake in many of these advertisements was the election or defeat of a candidate. 
Thus, an advertisement lacking express advocacy but criticizing Senator Smith in 
the weeks before the election was not subject to disclosure under FECA, and 
could be paid for with corporate or union funds, and is subject to no contribution 
limits. The conduct escapes FECA because the advertisement ends with 
something like, “Call Smith and tell her what you think of her Medicare plan” 
rather than “Defeat Smith.”  
 Sham issue advocacy became a major electioneering force in the 1990s.42 
BRCA sought to regulate sham issue advocacy through a new “electioneering 
communications” test.  Under BCRA, corporations and labor unions may not 
spend general treasury funds (but may spend PAC funds) on “electioneering 
communications,” just like corporations cannot spend general treasury funds on 
express advocacy under Austin. An electioneering communication “encompasses 
any broadcast, cable or satellite communication that refers to a candidate for 
federal office and that is aired within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a 
                                                                                                    
38 Id. at 44; see also id. at 80 (construing the term “expenditure” to have the same meaning in 
Section 434(e) as the Court earlier construed it in Section 608(e) of FECA). 
39 Id. at 44 n.52. 
40 Id. at 48-49. 
41 Id. at 80-81. 
42 Individuals, political parties, interest groups, labor unions, and corporations spent as much as 
$150 million in 1996 on such advertisements. DEBORAH BECK ET AL., ISSUE ADVOCACY DURING 
THE 1996 CAMPAIGN 3 (Annenberg Pub. Policy Ctr. Report Series No. 16, 1997), available at 
http://www.appc.penn.org/pub.htm. The figure climbed to at least $275 million during the 1998 
election. Jeffrey D. Stanger & Douglas G. Rivlin, Issue Advocacy Advertising During the 1997-
1998 Election Cycle, at http://appcpenn.org/issueads/report. htm. The number reached $509 
million for the 2000 election cycle. See Issue Advocacy in the 1999-2000 Election Cycle, at 
http://www.appcpenn.org/issueads/1999-2000issueadvocacy.pdf, at 4. See also McConnell, 540 
U.S. at 127 n.20. 





federal election in the jurisdiction in which that candidate is running for office.”43  
Thus, under section 203 of BCRA,44 a corporation or union could not use treasury 
funds to pay for a television advertisement broadcast shortly before the election 
criticizing Senator Smith by name for her lousy Medicare plan. 
 BCRA’s electioneering communications test solved the vagueness 
problem, but it introduced a potential problem of overbreadth.  An advertisement 
might not be intended or likely to affect the outcome of the election, and still the 
advertisement would fall within the bright line electioneering communications 
test of BCRA section 203.  For example, a television advertisement that a 
corporation would like to run shortly before the election urging the President 
running for reelection to intervene in a labor dispute could not be paid for with 
general treasury funds. 
 In McConnell v. FEC, plaintiffs argued that section 203 was 
unconstitutionally overbroad because it captured too much so-called “genuine 
issue advocacy.”45 The three lower court judges hearing McConnell devoted 
many pages and considerable effort to the overbreadth question.46
 
The Supreme 
Court majority opinion in McConnell nonetheless devoted only a single paragraph 
to this issue, rejecting the argument that the statute was overbroad.47 McConnell 
left open the question whether a corporation or union could bring an “as applied” 
challenge to BCRA section 203 by proving that a broadcast advertisement the 
entity wished to pay for from its general treasury funds was a “genuine issue 
advertisement” and therefore not subject to BCRA’s restrictions.  The “as 
applied” question returned to the Court in the WRTL case. 
 Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. “is a nonprofit, nonstock ideological 
advocacy corporation” recognized as tax exempt by the Internal Revenue 
Service.48  In late July 2004, WRTL began running a few television 
advertisements in Wisconsin opposing the Senate filibuster of some federal 
judicial nominations and urging voters to “Contact Senators Feingold and Kohl 
and tell them to oppose the filibuster.”49  Two days later, WRTL filed suit in 
federal court seeking a declaration and an injunction that it could run the ads and 
pay for them from its general treasury funds as “genuine issue ads,” despite the 
fact that Senator Feingold was running unopposed in a primary in mid-
                                                                                                    
43 WRTL, 127 S.Ct. at 2660 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A). 
44 2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(2) (2000 ed. Supp IV). 
45 The following few paragraphs are drawn from Hasen, supra note 4, at 53-56. 
46 McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 367-73 (D.D.C.) (Henderson, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003); id. at 610-39, 719-
52 (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring); id. at 792-99, 890-918 (Leon, J., concurring).  
47 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 696. 
48 WRTL, 127 S.Ct. at 2660. 
49 Id.   
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September.50  WRTL did not want to use its PAC funds to pay for the ads, and it 
could not take advantage of the MCFL exemption for ideological corporations 
because the organization took over $315,000 in donations from for-profit 
corporations to pay for the ads.51 
 The case went to the Supreme Court twice. First, the Court unanimously 
held that the issue whether there could be as applied challenges to BCRA section 
203 was not decided in McConnell.52 On remand, the three-judge district court 
split 2-1, holding that WRTL was entitled to an as applied exemption because, 
looking only at the face of the ad and not the political context, the ad was not 
necessarily an election-related ad (but instead about the “issue” of filibustering 
judicial nominees). 
The FEC and congressional intervenors appealed, giving the Supreme 
Court a second chance to hear the case.  The Court split three ways.  Three 
Justices (Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas) took the 
position that Austin and McConnell were wrongly decided and should be 
overturned, meaning that could WRTL not only pay for these ads from its 
treasury funds, but that corporations and unions could pay from such funds for 
any election-related advertisements, including those containing express 
advocacy.53 Chief Justice Roberts and Alito cast the controlling votes in what the 
Court referred to as the “principal opinion.”  They declined to reach the facial 
constitutional questions reached by Justice Scalia, holding instead that WRTL 
was entitled to an “as applied” exemption for its ads. The principal opinion set 
forth a very generous test for future as applied challenges to BCRA section 203—
an ad gets the exemption unless a court concludes, without looking at the political 
context, that it is “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an 
appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”54 
Four Justices (Justice Souter, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and 
Stevens) dissented, believing that WRTL’s ads, viewed in context, were 
indistinguishable from the kinds of advertising the Court in McConnell held it 
was permissible to regulate through a corporate PAC requirement in BCRA 
section 203.55   
 
B. Justice Souter on Campaign Finance Regulation and “Democratic 
Integrity”  
 
                                                                                                    
50 WRTL, 127 S.Ct. at 2661. 
51 WRTL, 127 S.Ct. at 2697 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
52 FEC v. WRTL, 546 U.S. at 412.   
53 Id. at 2674-2687 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
54 Id. at 2667. 
55 Id. at 2687-2705 (Souter, J., dissenting).  





  The first three parts of Justice Souter’s dissent in WRTL lay out in detail 
Justice Souter’s general views about the constitutionality of campaign finance 
regulation.  In these parts, Justice Souter sets forth the interests that campaign 
finance law is meant to protect and the problems with the current system.  This 
discussion reveals the less adulterated views of Justice Souter, unencumbered by 
the need to keep Justice O’Connor happy.   
 Justice Souter begins his dissent by stating that the “significance and 
effect” of the Court’s judgment “turn on three things: the demand for campaign 
money in huge amounts from large contributors, whose power has produced a 
cynical electorate; the congressional recognition of the ensuing threat to 
democratic integrity as reflected in a century of legislation restricting the electoral 
leverage of concentrations of money in corporate treasuries; and [McConnell], 
declaring the facial validity of the most recent Act of Congress in that tradition, a 
decision that is effectively, and unjustifiably, overruled today.”56 
  The Justice follows this introduction with a litany of facts to show the 
important role that money for campaign advertising plays in modern campaigns.  
Among the facts he recites are that in the 2004 campaign, more than half of the 
two principal candidate’s expenditures went to pay for advertising;57 that more 
than $2 billion was spent in the 2005-06 election cycle on television advertising, a 
record for a non-presidential contest;58 that 2008 presidential candidates had 
already raised over $150 million 18 months before the general election;59 that the 
eventual presidential nominees are expected to raise $500 million each, “about 
$680,000 per day over a 2-year election cycle;”60 and that over $4 billion was 
spent on state and federal elections during the 2004 election cycle.61 A footnote to 
this section describes issues related to increased fundraising pressures in state 
judicial elections, not directly at issue in WRTL. It describes a poll of business 
leaders, 90% of whom were at least “somewhat concerned” that campaign 
contributions and political pressure could affect judicial decisionmaking.62  
  Justice Souter sees two problems with this spending: first, the wealthy 
who spend or contribute more get more access to elected officials than others, and 
second, the public knows about the unequal access, and this knowledge 
undermines voter confidence in the electoral process.  On the first point, Justice 
Souter writes that the large demands of fundraising “assign power to the deep 
                                                                                                    
56 Id. at 2687 (Souter J., dissenting). 




61 Id. at 2688 & n.2. 
62 Id. at 2688 n. 2. 
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pockets.”63  “What high dollar pragmatists…get is special access to the officials 
they help elect, and disproportionate influence on those in power.”64  On the 
second point, Justice Souter concludes that the candidates’ “demand for big 
money” leads to “pervasive public cynicism,”65 citing pre-BCRA public opinion 
polls showing Court distrust of politicians who take large campaign contributions.  
Together, Justice Souter refers to these two interests as one in preserving 
“political integrity,”66 “democratic integrity,”67 and “electoral integrity”68 (terms 
he apparently uses interchangeably). 
 Justice Souter then singles out corporations as posing a special danger to 
democratic integrity: “the same characteristics that have made them engines of the 
Nation’s extraordinary prosperity have given them the financial muscle to gain 
‘advantage in the political marketplace’ when they turn from core corporate 
activity to electioneering.”69  He adds that it was “Congress’ judgment” that “the 
same concern extends to labor unions as to corporations.”70  Justice Souter then 
includes a lengthy recitation of the history of federal regulation of campaign 
financing, with an emphasis on the problems Congress saw with corporate and 
union election-related activity throughout the decades. Among the facts Justice 
Souter notes in this lengthy recitation is that the AFC-CIO funded pre-BCRA 
issue advocacy against first-term Republican House members through a 15-cent 
per member, per month assessment of union members.71  Congress could 
permissibly stop these practices in BCRA section 203, Justice Souter explains, to 
further the Austin rationale by curbing the “corrosive and distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the corporate form and 
that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s 
political ideas.”72 
 He concluded his lengthy discussion of the historical context as follows: 
 
This century-long tradition of legislation and judicial precedent 
rests on facing undeniable facts and testifies to an equally 
undeniable value.  Campaign finance reform has been a series of 
reactions to documented threats to electoral integrity obvious to 
                                                                                                    
63 Id. at 2688. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 2689.  
67 Id. at 2687. 
68 Id. at 2697. 
69 Id. at 2689.   
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 2694. 
72 Id. at 2696 (quoting Austin). 





any voter, posed by large sums of money from corporate and union 
treasuries, with no redolence of “grassroots” about them.  Neither 
Congress’s decisions nor our own have understood the corrupting 
influence of money in politics as being limited to outright bribery 
or discrete quid pro quo; campaign finance reform has instead 
consistently focused on the more pervasive distortion of electoral 
institutions by concentrated wealth, on the special access and 
guaranteed favor that sap the representative integrity of American 
government and defy public confidence in its institutions  From 
early in the 20th century through the decision in McConnell, we 
have acknowledged that the value of democratic integrity justifies 
a realistic response when corporations and labor unions commit the 
concentrated moneys in their treasuries to electioneering.73 
 
The final part of Justice Souter’s dissent is predictable given the Justice’s 
earlier opinions and votes.  There, the Justice argues that the WRTL principal 
opinion’s new “as applied” test is inconsistent with McConnell and effectively 
overrules McConnell’s facial upholding of BCRA section 203.74 He believes the 
WRTL ads are the prototypical type of ad that BCRA was meant to regulate.75 
Justice Souter also predicts that the principal opinion will lead to the reemergence 
of sham issue advocacy, as corporations and unions pay for ads that are likely to 
affect the outcome of elections but that meet the new “no reasonable 
interpretation” test.76   
 
C. Justices Souter as an Emerging Egalitarian 
  
 To be sure, one can read Justice Souter’s dissent as simply an extension of 
the anti-corruption rationale of Buckley: Congress may permissibly limit 
contributions to prevent the corruption of elected officials and the appearance of 
corruption caused when the public believes that large donors “call the tune.”77  
                                                                                                    
73 Id. at 2697 (emphasis added). 
74 Id. at 2704 (“There is neither a theoretical nor a practical basis to claim that McConnell’s 
treatment of § 203 survives.”). 
75 Id. at 2698 (“it is beyond all reasonable debate that the ads are constitutionally subject to 
regulation under McConnell”). 
76 Id. at 2705 (“After today, the ban on contributions by corporations and unions and the limitation 
on their corrosive spending when they enter the political arena are open to easy circumvention, 
and the possibilities for regulating corporate and union campaign money are unclear.”). 
77 Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 390 (“Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the 
cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to 
take part in democratic governance.”). 
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For a few reasons, I believe Justice Souter’s dissent is more consistent with an 
egalitarian rationale for campaign finance regulation. 
 First, BCRA section 203 concerns independent spending by corporations 
and unions on election-related broadcast advertisements.  Since Buckley, the 
Court has viewed such independent spending as not presenting the same danger of 
corruption as contributions to candidates.  Though Justice Souter suggests in a 
footnote to his dissent that corporate spending limits in candidate elections may 
be justified on anticorruption grounds,78 he offers no sustained argument to back 
it up, a point not lost on Justice Scalia.79  Simply put, rhetoric aside, Justice 
Souter in his lengthy dissent provides no evidence supporting the claim that 
independent spending serves anticorruption goals.  His problem with such 
spending must be elsewhere. 
 Justice Souter’s dissent is full of talk of “distortion”—even “pervasive 
distortion”80—of the political process by corporate and union spending.  This is 
Austin “corrosion,” which occurs when corporations use their great wealth to 
spend out of proportion with the views they represent in society—an egalitarian 
notion.81 Indeed, Justice Souter does not argue that the “special access” large 
donors (and presumably large independent spenders) purchase is a corrupt 
transaction in a quid-pro-quo/“dollars for political favors” sense.82  Instead, he 
claims that these donors (and spenders) have “disproportionate” influence over 
the electoral process. It is this inequality of access (which ostensibly creates an 
appearance of inequality83), rather than the sale of special favors, which Justice 
Souter says drives public cynicism about the electoral process.   
Justice Souter’s focus on total campaign spending also suggests there is 
more going on here than simply a concern about corruption.   After all, if a 
candidate spent $10 million on an election having raised one million $10 
contributions, the potential for corruption by donors appears minimal.  But Justice 
                                                                                                    
78 WRTL, 127 S.Ct. at 2692 n.7. 
79 “The dissent asserts that Austin was faithful to Bellotti’s principles, to prove which it quotes a 
footnote in Bellotti leaving open the possibility that independent expenditures by corporations 
might someday be demonstrated to beget quid-pro-quo corruption. [Citation.] That someday has 
never come.  No one seriously believes that independent expenditures could possibly give rise to 
quid-pro-quo corruption without being subject to regulation as coordinated expenditures.”  Id. at 
2678 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
80 Id. at 2697 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
81 See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM 
BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 111-14 (2003) (arguing that Austin embraces a political equality 
rationale for campaign finance regulation). 
82 Cf. FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (“The 
hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors”). 
83 Hasen, supra note 11, at 909 (arguing that concerns about voter confidence may best be thought 
of as raising an “appearance of inequality” concern). 





Souter’s view that the total amount of campaign spending is obscene and 
dangerous to the “integrity” of American democracy shows an egalitarian impulse 
to make campaigns less about money and more about ideas. 
The Justice’s focus on total wealth highlights the point that many of the 
arguments apply equally to large corporate and union spending in elections and to 
large spending by wealthy individuals too.84  Justice Souter therefore might 
support spending limits applied to individuals because such spending could cause 
the same “pervasive distortion” of the political process if wealthy spenders’ views 
would not proportionally represent the views of many voters.  While Justice 
Souter might respond that it is appropriate to limit this idea only to corporations, 
because of the special way in which they can accumulate wealth, it is too late for 
him to make that argument: labor unions do not accumulate wealth the way 
corporations do (a point I return to in the next section); yet Justice Souter is 
perfectly content with congressional action extending corporate limits to labor 
unions.  Moreover, some wealthy individuals no doubt gained much of their 
wealth with the assistance of corporations, and therefore they too enjoy the 
benefits of the corporate form and can translate their economic wealth into 
political influence. 
 Together, I believe it is fair to characterize Justice Souter as an “emerging 
egalitarian,” someone inclined to but still struggling with issues of using 
campaign finance regulation to provide some measure of equality to the American 
political system.  We will have to see how Justice Souter hashes these issues out 
in future cases.  In the next section, I note some issues that need further 
development in his egalitarian jurisprudence. 
  
D. The Next Iterations of Souter Egalitarianism 
 
 Labeling someone a “campaign finance egalitarian” is insufficiently 
precise, as there are a great variety of equality approaches in the area.85  Justice 
Breyer, for example, is a more firmly committed campaign finance egalitarian 
than Justice Souter, having set forth is ideas on promoting political equality in his 
                                                                                                    
84 Cf. WRTL, 127 S.Ct. at 2686-87 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the “wondrous 
irony” that BCRA has let to the concentration of “power in the hands of the country’s wealthiest 
individuals and their so-called 527 organizations, unregulated by § 203”). 
85 For example, Professor Foley is concerned about unequal spending in the political process 
because it is likely to have an unfair effect on electoral outcomes. See Edward B. Foley, Equal-
Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204 
(1994).  My own work is concerned about unequal spending in the political process because it is 
likely to have an unfair effect on legislative outcomes.  See Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons 
for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. 
L. REV. 1 (1996). 
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Shrink Missouri concurrence and in academic writings.  In addition, there are 
some important jurisprudential differences between them. 
 Justice Breyer’s “participatory self-government” objective argues that 
there are important First Amendment interests on “both sides” of the political 
equation and that a careful balancing of rights is necessary.86 He is willing to 
defer somewhat to legislators, who have greater expertise in campaign finance 
than judges.  But he is wary that such laws might be means of incumbent self-
protection, and for this reason he urges closer scrutiny of campaign finance 
laws.87  
 In contrast, Justice Souter believes more in deference to the legislature, 
and seems relatively unconcerned about incumbent protection.  In the New 
Deference cases he authored, he brushes aside any concern about incumbency 
protection.  Justice Souter also seems less worried than Justice Breyer about 
striking the right balance with the First Amendment. 
 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Randall v. Sorrell88 illustrates the 
difference in the approaches of the two Justices.  Randall principally concerned 
the question whether Vermont’s campaign contribution limits were too low.  
Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Chief Justice Roberts and Alito, concluded 
that the amounts were too high, because there were “danger signs” the law was 
aimed at protecting incumbents and because the measure was too restrictive given 
the anticorruption goals it was purportedly trying to accomplish.89  Justice Souter, 
in dissent, would have applied a much more deferential test for determining when 
a campaign contribution limit is too low, holding that because the Vermont limits 
were not “laughabl[y] low,”90 they were constitutional.  As I have argued, it is 
very difficult to justify the Vermont limits on anticorruption grounds; the better 
reading of the Vermont legislature’s intent—and Justice Souter’s intent to uphold 
the limits—is a commitment to equality in campaign finance fundraising and 
spending.91 
 The two Justices also split on the expenditure limit question: Justice 
Breyer wrote that Vermont’s candidate spending limits were unconstitutional 
under Buckley;92 while Justice Souter would not have reached the question.93  
                                                                                                    
86 BREYER, supra note 2, at 48. 
87 Id. at 149. 
88 126 S.Ct. 2479 (2006). 
89 Id. at 2492 (plurality opn.). 
90 Id. at 2514 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
91 Hasen, supra note 887 (“It seems quite obvious that the real goal of the Vermont measure, 
hidden from debate in order to comply with Buckley’s rejection of the equality rationale, was the 
promotion of political equality.”). 
92 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2491 (plurality opn.). 
93 Id. at 2511 (Souter, J., dissenting). 





Though Justice Breyer may well have tempered his opinions to keep the votes of 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito,94 looking at the Randall opinions on their 
face, Justice Souter seems more committed to egalitarianism than Justice Breyer.  
 Justice Souter, even if he becomes a committed egalitarian, should 
consider adopting some of Justice Breyer’s skepticism about legislatively-enacted 
campaign finance law.  After all, not all campaign finance measures will be 
passed with the good government intentions of the prototypical New England 
town meeting.  A committed egalitarian should be wary of self-dealing disguised 
as political reform. 
 In addition, Justice Souter should devote some attention to three other 
issues under the “democratic integrity” approach. 
 1. What’s Wrong with Large Total Spending? Return to the example I 
gave in the last section of a candidate raising $10 million in one million $10 
donations.  Not only does this scenario not raise serious concerns about 
corruption, it could well be something to celebrate from an egalitarian 
perspective.  Rather than going to a “fat cat” who can give $10 million to a 
candidate, the candidate is able to raise a great deal from a large number of 
modest contributions.  It is this impetus toward the democratizing effect of small 
donations that makes the rise of Internet fundraising so exciting from an 
egalitarian perspective. 
 For this reason, Justice Souter’s concerns about total spending are 
somewhat misplaced.  In today’s busy world, in which many rational voters do 
not devote much time to considering whom to vote for, candidates need to use 
media such as television, radio, newspapers, direct mail, and the Internet, to reach 
voters.  Many of these means are going to be expensive, and an egalitarian 
perspective that would decrease total spending runs the risk of not giving enough 
resources for many voices to be heard in a vibrant debate over candidacies and 
ballot measures.  Seeking to limit total spending, in other words, does not hit the 
target that egalitarians should aim for. 
 Justice Souter might respond that it is not the total amount of spending 
that is itself objectionable; rather it is the demands that the high costs of 
campaigns put on candidates to raise ever larger amounts of money.  That is a fair 
point, but it is not one that is attacked by going after total spending.  Campaign 
financing can promote egalitarianism in ways that do not decrease public 
spending but decrease a candidate’s need to raise ever large funds.  For example, 
public subsidies for campaigns (perhaps tied to matching small donations) or free 
air time for candidates required of broadcasters as part of their broadcast 
                                                                                                    
94 Hasen, supra note 8, at 852 (“Competition arose in Randall to test the constitutionality of low 
contribution limits as a rear-guard action by Justice Breyer to cling to the framework of Buckley v. 
Valeo…”). 
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obligations could help meet such needs.  Indeed, I have argued that low 
contribution and spending limits in Vermont could well be unconstitutional even 
accepting the political equality rationale for regulation unless the state also 
provides subsidies for vibrant political speech.95 
 
 2. Is There Any Evidence to Support the Idea that Campaign Finance 
Regulation Can Decrease Public Cynicism or Increase Voter Confidence in the 
Electoral Process?   Justice Souter’s argument for “democratic integrity” is 
premised not only on the “disproportionate” or “special” access afforded to large 
campaign donors and spenders.  He also believes that this disproportionate 
spending leads to increased public cynicism and a decline in voter confidence in 
Democratic government. 
 Though Justice Souter provides ample support for the proposition that 
voters are cynical that large donors have disproportionate influence in 
Washington, he provides no support for the proposition that campaign finance 
laws such as BCRA decrease public cynicism about the political process (or at 
least prevent a further slide in public confidence in the electoral process).  The 
social science evidence to date does not support the latter implied assertion in 
Justice Souter’s work.  Nathaniel Persily and Kelli Lammie, for example, found 
an increase in public cynicism after Congress passed BCRA.96  These authors 
believe that outside factors, and not campaign finance regulation, drives public 
cynicism about government.97   
 The lack of evidence of a connection between public attitudes and 
campaign finance regulation is not fatal to Justice Souter’s position.  It simply 
suggests that the Justice should place more emphasis on the issue of 
“disproportionate influence” and less on the appearance of inequality in crafting 
his arguments in favor of regulation. 
 
 3. What’s Wrong With Large Union Spending?  Perhaps the least 
satisfying portion of Justice Souter’s opinion is his treatment of the regulation of 
labor unions.  Labor unions amass funds by collecting dues from their members, 
not through the use of a corporate form to engage in a for-profit enterprise.  Yet 
Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in WRTL elides over the difference when he 
cites the Austin distortion rationale in explaining the reason for regulating 
corporations and then simply notes that it was “Congress’ judgment” that “the 
same concern extends to labor unions as to corporations.”98  He also noted 
                                                                                                    
95 Hasen, supra note 8, at 889. 
96 Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance Law: 
When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 123 (2004). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 





Congressional fears of “accumulated wealth” in the hands of labor unions as 
prompting Congress to pass the Taft-Hartley Act, limiting union campaign 
spending.99 
 To the extent that Justice Souter believes labor union spending is 
objectionable because some unions are wealthy, he has an argument for limiting 
spending by all wealthy individuals and entities, not just corporations and labor 
unions.  But the opinion zeroes in on corporations and unions (condemning their 
“corrosive spending”100), and not all wealthy groups, without adequate 
explanation about the dangers of labor unions.   
Among the parade of pre-BCRA horribles chronicled by Justice Souter is 
that “the President of the AFL-CIO stated that the bulk of its ads were targeted for 
broadcast in districts represented by first-term freshman Republicans who…may 
be defeatable, and the Senate committee found that the union used a $.15 per 
member, per month assessment to finance issue ads that were clearly designed to 
influence the outcome of the election.”101 Again, putting aside the great total 
wealth of unions, it is difficult to see what is objectionable from an egalitarian (or, 
for that matter, an anticorruption) perspective about this spending.  Here is 
collective action that should be celebrated: a large number of people have made 
miniscule contributions collectively for political action.  Political power is not 
being driven by a few rich spenders: it is being driven by many people of modest 
means banding together in an effective way.  Justice Souter needs to provide a 
much better explanation for what is objectionable about this spending. 
 Aside from an argument that spending by all wealthy individuals and 
entities should be limited, the best argument an egalitarian might make for 
regulating union spending is political expediency.  For more than 50 years, 
congressional limits on corporate and union spending have gone hand-in-hand.  A 
ruling striking down limits on union (but not corporate) election-related spending 
could well lead Congress to lift the limits on corporate spending as well, a result 
that may be worse than the status quo from an egalitarian perspective.  It is not 
clear if Justice Souter had this realpolitik in mind in crafting his WRTL dissent, 
but the final product offers an unsatisfying explanation of the constitutional basis 




 Justice Souter may never again have an opportunity to write a majority 
opinion in a campaign finance case in his tenure on the Court.  But the Court’s 
                                                                                                    
99 Id. at 2690-91. 
100 Id. at 2705. 
101 Id. at 2694 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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experience in this area shows that its decisions have swung like a pendulum, and 
the views of Justice Souter could well be picked up by a future Supreme Court 
majority that either explicitly or implicitly accepts political equality arguments for 
campaign finance regulation.   
 For this reason, Justice Souter should devote care to the further 
development of his “democratic integrity” arguments for campaign finance 
regulation.  Justice Souter, more than any other Justice on the current Supreme 
Court, has freed those who would craft campaign finance regulation in the name 
of political equality from Supreme Court interference.  Now, as his position 
becomes the minority position on the Supreme Court, he can leave future 
generations with a more coherent and compelling egalitarian rationale for sensible 
campaign finance laws yet to be written. 
